Soft Power for Aceh Conflict Resolution and Political Decentralization

Gladis Herazati1 Rahyunika Azzahra2 Fransisca Yessianti3 Ayu Andini4 Hayyu Angreni5 Wanda Kurnia6 Paskaria Erni Kurniati7 Diradtya Frisca8 Winda Sartika Sari9 Jagad Aditya Dewantara10

Pancasila and Citizenship Education Study Program, Faculty of Teacher Training and Education, Universitas Tanjungpura, Pontianak City, West Kalimantan Province, Indonesia1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10

Email: f1221211028@student.untan.ac.id f1221211018@student.untan.ac.id2
f1221211023@student.untan.ac.id3 f1221211015@student.untan.ac.id4
f1221211012@student.untan.ac.id5 f1221211039@student.untan.ac.id6
f1221211010@student.untan.ac.id7 f1221211031@student.untan.ac.id8
f1221211034@student.untan.ac.id9 jagad02@fkip.untan.ac.id10

Abstract
From various kinds of history originating from Aceh, the tragedy is quite a lot colored by violence. Starting from the Soekarno era to the Megawati era. From each era of government, the handling that was carried out also varied greatly. The dialogue approach began during the Abdurrahman Wahid Administration. There was an agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that it would stop the violence mediated by HDC. The agreement was the Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh (Humanitarian Pause Agreement) on May 12, 2000, but the Acehnese people ignored this agreement where the security situation in Aceh was still colored by violence. When the Government of Indonesia changed its leader to become Megawati, acts of violence continued to occur in Aceh and efforts were made again by HDC with the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on December 12, 2022. However, this was still not able to reduce the acts of violence that occurred. On May 19, 2003 Aceh was declared under military emergency status. It was only during the reigns of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla that the Aceh conflict was resolved peacefully as evidenced by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki on 15 August 2005, which brought Aceh from war to peace.

Keywords: Soft Power, Aceh, Conflict Resolution, Political Decentralization

INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon that before the signing of the Helsinki MOU agreement, the people of the Aceh region quite often used hard power in dealing with conflicts where physical strength for the Aceh region was very often used as the main tool in dealing with conflicts. Or can we say that at that time Aceh was very thick with the law of the jungle. But actually violence is not a natural thing to be defended as a handling in a conflict. Because with violence, we will only feel satisfied with our heart's desires, but sooner or later the opposite party will also respond with violence and violence and the conflict will continue. Therefore, it is felt that this soft power will be better able to handle a conflict and on the other hand this soft power can influence other countries. In implementing soft power, it is true that image is prioritized, but this is what will later facilitate good relations with various parties, both external and internal parties.

And in the end the conflict in Aceh was resolved peacefully and through negotiations which on this occasion were mediated by the former President of Finland from CMI, namely Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. The resolutions used are bilateral or multilateral negotiations, mediation by third parties, and legal decisions by independent institutions. Aceh also has decentralization
which has the aim of creating political stability. But on the other hand, we can see or examine decentralization from two perspectives, namely the political perspective and the administrative perspective. From a political perspective, decentralization is the delegation of power from the center to the regions in carrying out their functions to the government. Meanwhile, from an administrative perspective, decentralization is the granting of authority from a higher government unit to institutions for the public interest.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Aceh Conflict in the Trajectory of History

The Aceh conflict is the result of the Acehnese people's efforts to build an "Acehnese" profile in the context of their relations, both with foreign powers and with the Republic of Indonesia. The conflicts experienced by the people of Aceh both in relation to the outside world and in their internal context offer a catalyst for the formation of their identity. The formation of this Acehnese identity is the result of the link between Aceh's historical facts and the historical awareness that is developing among the Acehnese people themselves. It is this identity formation process that ultimately builds the Acehnese people's awareness to be more sensitive and vulnerable to any attempts by outsiders to eliminate this identity. This self-perception that links its historical footprints with the Islamic world at a certain level has fostered a strong cultural identity. This Islamic identity that was inherent long before Indonesia's independence, in the course of history turned out to be a trigger for conflict between Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia. Aceh's Islamic identity is not only used by Acehnese political elites to build community collective sentiment when dealing with other groups but is also used by the central government (Nurhasanah et al., 2023).

During the Soekarno era, rebellions committed by the people of Aceh against the central government were recorded 2 times. The first was the rebellion led by Teungku M. Daud Beureuh and the second by Hasan Tiro. At the beginning of the founding of the Indonesian state, Aceh was willing to support Indonesian independence. From a political perspective, this willingness to support independence and an invitation to defend Indonesia's independence and an invitation to defend Indonesia's independence are important because it is a self-declaration that is willing to make its territory part of Indonesia's territory. Aceh's support for the Republic is not only limited to financial contributions, but also in communication and political propaganda to voice the voice of the Republic through radio transmitters to the international community. Another political contribution made by Aceh to the Republic is the support of the Acehnese leader, Daud Beureueh for the establishment of the Indonesian National Armed Forces/TNI. In the early days of the founding of the Indonesian state, in various regions including Aceh there were many people's paramilitary groups and armed forces who took part in defending independence without a single line of command and coordination from the central government.

Throughout the physical revolution to defend independence, it was clear from a Daud Beureueh that he supported Indonesian independence and acknowledged Soekarno's leadership as president. But there are also 3 main reasons why Daud Beureueh rebelled against RI. The first is related to the concept of statehood, especially with regard to the basis and form of the state. Before independence, the political discourse that developed among the freedom fighters at that time was about the basis of the state to be established. Soekarno's speech at the BPUPKI meeting on June 1, 1945, which offered Pancasila as the basis of the state, did not receive a positive response from Islamic figures. Apart from that, Daud Beureueh's disappointment with the center was when President Soekarno made a speech emphasizing that it was impossible for Indonesia to use Islam as the basis of the state (Amalia & Nurgiansah,
2023). This made Daud Beureuh disappointed so he declared to join and become part of the Islamic State of Indonesia/NII which had previously been proclaimed by Kartosuwirjo.

The rebellions carried out by Daud Beureuh were the reaction of the people of Aceh against the centralized politics of the Central Government in the early days of the Republic. This centralization policy that brought Indonesia back into a unitary state can be understood in the context of the national political situation at that time, namely during the period 1949 to 1950. In the midst of an unstable political situation and the very fragile existence of the Republic of Indonesia, it is understandable if the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia put more emphasis on national consolidation efforts and strengthen the unity of Indonesia's territories into a solid state system. Then the reason that prompted the rebellion of Daud Beureuh was the non-accommodation of Islamic values in the government in Aceh. The next Aceh conflict that peaked quite a bit was the Hasan Tiro conflict, but there were principal differences between the rebellions of Daud Beureueh and Hasan Tiro. This difference is related to the background of the rebellion and related to the goals of the rebellion.

The Daud Beureueh rebellion, which originally only wanted autonomy in the field of education and the implementation of Islamic law but was still within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia/NKRI, and the Hasan Tiro rebellion, which from the beginning had the aim of forming an independent and separate Aceh state from the Republic of Indonesia. However, with all these differences, the two rebellions demanded central accommodation of Islamic values in Aceh which developed into regional resistance demanding separation and establishing an independent state separate from the center.

The Hasan Tiro rebellion occurred at a time when the Soeharto/New Order government was focusing on economic development which required political stability, so that the Center never tolerated regional aspirations which, according to autonomy, let alone separate themselves. Therefore, not long after Hasan Tiro proclaimed GAM, the Center took firm steps, namely by launching military action or hard power. In the end, repressive military actions not only did not solve the Aceh problem, but instead gave rise to new resistance from the Acehnese people. The hard power policy or tough military actions carried out by the Soeharto government against every regional aspiration that demanded autonomy or secede were at least driven by 2 factors, namely internal and external. The fall of Suharto in the Aceh conflict in 1998 caused a change in the wave of reform in Indonesia and changed the domestic political landscape, from a monolithic one to a more open and democratic one. Changes to a more democratic political system, accompanied by demands for law enforcement, have changed the perspective of the new government under President Habibie in viewing the problems left behind by President Soeharto, including in viewing the Aceh conflict.

The existence of this new paradigm for Aceh has drastically changed the political behavior of the Habibie government, especially the TNI towards Aceh as a central response to the aspirations that developed following the fall of Suharto. Habibie’s political stance, which corrected the policies of the previous government, also had an impact on the political stance of politicians in the People’s Representative Council, Republic of Indonesia/DPR-RI. Compared to military/hard power actions during the Soeharto era, the DPR-RI’s political stance urging the government to intensify this conversation indicates a growing awareness of the need for soft power policies to resolve the Aceh conflict in the post-Suharto era. It was at this point that the soft power policy in Aceh conflict resolution began to show its embryos, which would later be used by governments after Habibie.

In October 1999, Habibie was replaced by President Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, he is also known as a person who has a strong commitment to democracy and pluralism. Abdurrahman Wahid’s political attitude which is democratic and respects diversity is reflected
in the way he views the Aceh conflict. Although known as a democrat and a pluralist, Wahid's attitude towards Aceh was not very positive. Despite having a skeptical view of Aceh, it was precisely during his presidency, for the first time since the Aceh conflict broke out in 1976, that Indonesia was willing to hold dialogue and negotiations with GAM. The Humanitarian Pause negotiations presented an important development in the Aceh conflict, both for Indonesia and GAM.

Megawati Soekarnoputri's ascension to the presidency in July 2001 was a turning point in the TNI's role on the national political stage in the context of Aceh conflict resolution. Megawati's very strong political commitment to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia became a political backing for the TNI in overcoming the Aceh conflict. It was the existence of strong political support at that time that made the Megawati Government confident enough to carry out a hard power policy, as seen from the openness of the Government in providing explanations to the public regarding the costs provided for military operations in Aceh. It is in this context that Megawati carried out policies of hard power (military operations) and soft power (granting broad autonomy) simultaneously in the same period. Thus, it appears that Megawati's policy towards the Aceh conflict is a combination of hard power and soft power. In general it can be said that in the SBY-JK era, resolution of the Aceh conflict was carried out by soft power or by peaceful means. There were two factors that encouraged the use of soft power during the SBY-JK era, namely, political factors and personal factors. SBY-JK who was elected through a direct democratic process showed a political attitude that prioritized peaceful methods in resolving conflicts, including the Aceh conflict. This democratic atmosphere has also had a significant impact on the way the SBY-JK Government has responded to the Aceh conflict.

SBY-JK's political stance towards Aceh tends to promote a peaceful settlement or soft power and by respecting the dignity of the Acehnese people is not solely influenced by the democratic atmosphere that was created after the direct presidential election. SBY's attitude which emphasized soft power had been detected long before he became president. Like Yudhoyono, Kalla also prefers a soft power approach. Thus, from this description, it can be concluded that SBY-JK does have a personal commitment that prioritizes dialogue and soft power approaches in resolving the Aceh conflict.

From the experience of previous negotiations, SBY-JK has understood that GAM is a political reality whose existence must be acknowledged, if the Aceh conflict is to be resolved. It is in the context of acknowledging the existence of GAM in conflict resolution that Farid Husain approaches key GAM figures. On orders from Kalla, Farid continued to approach GAM figures and tried to meet Ahtisaari to ask for his help as a mediator in the Aceh conflict. Finally, Juha and Farid were able to meet Ahtisaari in February 2004. And with Juha's assistance, on December 23, 2004, Ahtisaari expressed his willingness to become a mediator for the Aceh conflict resolution. It was to build this trust that, before the Helsinki negotiations began, Farid began playing his soft power moves, namely approaching GAM family members in Aceh. The Government also carried out a family and humanitarian approach when the negotiations were already underway in Helsinki. This kind of soft power approach turns out to be very heart-touching so it builds trust. The approach of soft power and kinship carried out by the government above is more of an informal psychological nature. The essence of Aceh conflict resolution is centered on the extent of the special autonomy or privileges given to Aceh. It is this degree of specificity in Aceh that is the central debate in the resolution of the Aceh conflict.

Decentralized Politics and Conflict Resolution

There were two phases in the politics of decentralization and conflict resolution in Aceh. The first was when Aceh only demanded privileges in implementing Islamic law, such as the demands of the Daud Beureueh rebellion in an attempt to quell the rebellion with Law no.
24/1956, the government only gave Aceh its own separate province from North Sumatra. While the special authority to implement Islamic law and maintain Acehnese customs which was precisely the core of Daud Beureueh’s demands was not accommodated, this is evident from the non-fulfillment of the wishes of the Acehnese people by the Center, namely privileges in carrying out Islamic law and maintaining adat as a result of which Daud Beureueh’s rebellion continued. The second was when Aceh’s demands became more serious, namely the separation from Indonesia as an independent state proclaimed by Hasan Tiro in 1976, Hasan Tiro’s rebellion was caused by economic injustice, so that Aceh demanded independence as its own country separate from Indonesia.

Starting from the political dynamics of decentralization from the center to the regions above and if this is placed in the context of the Aceh conflict, it can be seen that the failure of resolution of the conflict in Aceh was partly due to the absence of seriousness from the center to address what was the source of the conflict. Even if there was an attempt to meet the demands of the Acehnese people, it was given too late as an example of Daud Beureueh’s demands in 1953 which "only" asked the Center to grant autonomy to Aceh in the field of religion and customs, the Center did not fulfill. GAM does not want to negotiate with the government if the precondition for negotiations is special autonomy which is arranged without agreement or negotiation with them. Aceh demands.

Negotiations with GAM in the history of conflict resolution in Aceh from the time of the Daud Beureueh uprising to Hasan Tiro, it was only during the SBY-JK era that the conflict was resolved with the signing of the Helsinki MOU on August 15 2005. The Helsinki agreement was the result of a compromise between the Government and GAM on a very fundamental, namely whether Aceh will be separated from Indonesia as an independent country, or receive special autonomy under the auspices of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. During previous administrations, it was very difficult for the two poles of view to compromise, so the conflict continued.

Granting this broad special autonomy was not a sudden decision made by the SBY-JK Government, but was the result of the dynamics of the negotiations in Helsinki. In this case, Ahtisaari’s role as a mediator was very crucial, knowing that during the previous round of COHA negotiations, GAM negotiators were arrested by Indonesian officials. , before the Helsinki negotiations, Ahtisaari, mediator from CMI, put forward 3 (three) conditions so that the negotiation process and the implementation of the results of the negotiations would run smoothly, namely firstly that GAM members were not arrested during the negotiations. must think about how to integrate former GAM combatants into society. Prior to the Helsinki negotiations in the SBY-JK era, the core of the problem that became the vortex of the debate between the Government and GAM regarding conflict resolution lay in the two poles of the interests of the two warring parties, namely on the one hand the Government wanted Aceh to remain within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and GAM. receive special autonomy determined by the Government as stipulated in Law no. 18/2001, on the other hand GAM wants separation from Indonesia or independence.

The tsunami that hit Aceh on December 26, 2004 exposed Aceh to the international world, especially because many friendly countries and international organizations wanted to distribute humanitarian assistance. When the tsunami occurred, Aceh was still in a military emergency situation and the Government was still carrying out military operations; Meanwhile GAM is still holding armed resistance. This situation put GAM in a difficult position: continue the war with the Indonesian government or announce a ceasefire. On the part of GAM, the achievement of the Helsinki peace agreement reflected a significant shift in its line of struggle, namely is demand independence to accepting special autonomy as agreed in the Helsinki MOU.
Rondinelli said that decentralization aims to create political stability and national unity by giving authority to wider regions so that these regions feel an interest in maintaining harmonious relations with the center (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983: 16). This statement is felt to be irrelevant to the Aceh case. In the case of Aceh, both during the Sukarno era, the Soeharto era and post-Soeharto as well as the SBY-JK era, the decentralization policy in the form of granting special autonomy was not granted when in Aceh there were no longer any forces that disturbed political stability and national unity. In fact, on the contrary, special autonomy was given to Aceh even when the disturbance to security by GAM was still prominent. The granting of special autonomy was actually given to Aceh with the aim of resolving the conflict. Rondinelli said that the purpose of decentralization was to increase political stability and national unity by giving opportunities to various groups of people to participate in decision-making processes, thereby increasing their interest in maintaining the political system. In conflict situations, political stability or peace is not created immediately and also not only because of decentralization, but must be preceded by the disappearance of the conflict itself.

From the analysis above it can be put forward the proposition that the political decentralization carried out by SBY-JK is by granting special autonomy in the context of conflict resolution through negotiations and compromises so as to achieve political stability and peace in Aceh. Galtung offers a theory about the relationship between democracy, decision making, and government behavior. Galtung's theory says, "The more democratic the country, the more shared the decision making; and the more shared the decision-making, the less belligerent the country" (Galtung, 1998: 54). According to Galtung's theory, when a country becomes democratic, more parties are involved in the decision-making process. And, if many parties are involved in decision-making, the country will stay away from violence or war.

In Asymmetric Conflict Transformation Vayrynen said that to analyze how a conflict can be transformed so that peace is achieved, it can be seen from 5 (five) aspects, namely: (1) context transformation; (2) structural transformation; (3) actor transformation; (4) problem transformation (issue transformation); and (5) group and individual transformation (personal and group transformation). In relation to the Aceh conflict, the transformation of this context can be seen in 3 (three) ways, namely in the national context: the start of the reform era in 1998 and the release of East Timor from the Republic of Indonesia in 1999; and in the international context: the September 11 tragedy (terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001). The reform era that began since the fall of Suharto in May 1998 has opened up a wider public space for people to voice their aspirations.

Structural transformation in conflict resolution refers to changes that occur in the pattern of relations between the two conflicting parties. According to Vayrynen's theory, conflict occurs when the relationship between the two warring parties is unequal, in the sense that one party is stronger and the other is weaker. In order to resolve the conflict there must be a change in the structure of the relationship between the two parties, because a change in the structure will create an opening for them to negotiate. Conflict transformation can occur when there is a change in the balance of power between the two parties, for example, when there is support from a third party for a weaker party or when a third party wants to become a mediator to resolve the conflict.

The transformation of the actors involved can also affect the process of changing from conflict to peace. In the case of the Aceh conflict, this transformation of actors is related to changes in attitudes, views, or policy orientation from both the SBY-JK government and GAM. There were 2 (two) things that caused this change in GAM's attitude, namely first, the absence of international support; and secondly, there is a very significant concession from the Government, namely the granting of expanded autonomy and accommodation of political rights.
for the people of Aceh in the form of forming local parties. Problem transformation in conflict resolution efforts can arise if there are new issues that are disputed between the two parties. The emergence of the human rights dimension in the Aceh conflict was made possible by the opening up of the Indonesian mass media following the fall of Suharto’s power in May 1998. The mass media began to dare to reveal military behavior in various conflicts in the regions, including Aceh. Apart from the openness of the mass media, the courage of the Acehnese people to demand justice in the field of human rights apart from demands for independence, was also driven by the support from the international community for efforts to disclose past human rights violations and urged that the perpetrators be brought to justice (Sulistiyanto, 2001: 446).

Group and individual transformation in conflict refers to changes in attitudes shown by individuals, groups or governments towards conflict resolution. On the GAM side, this transformation also occurred in the GAM leadership. Indonesia’s success in holding democratic direct elections in 2004 gave hope to many parties for Indonesia to uphold democratic values. This democratic election also helped change the attitude and perception of the GAM leadership towards the SBY-JK Government, which was considered to be more democratic. Resolution of the Aceh conflict was possible because of the willingness of the two warring parties, namely the Government of Indonesia and GAM, to negotiate. However, from the perspective of the Government, the decision to negotiate with GAM was not an easy one, because the conflict itself is asymmetrical. Asymmetric conflict is defined as a conflict between two unequal parties, such as between a legitimate government and a rebel (Miall, 1999: 12). The Aceh conflict, in the view of many parties, is an asymmetric conflict. At least Ahtisaari, the mediator of the Helsinki negotiations, told GAM negotiators that the negotiations between the Government of Indonesia and GAM that he would mediate “not to be a negotiation between equals, that the government of the Republic of Indonesia was recognized and that we were not” (Djuli & Rahman, 2008: 28). Likewise with Morfit (2007: 118) who considers that the RI-GAM conflict is an asymmetric conflict. Many opinions say that the government should not negotiate with the rebels because this will only be interpreted by the international community, especially by GAM itself, as an acknowledgment of GAM’s existence (Djalal, Tempo, 25 September 2005). This view that refuses to negotiate with the rebels is only valid when viewed from a formal legalistic aspect. Nevertheless, the problem of the Aceh conflict must not only be seen from a purely formal legalistic aspect, but also needs to be seen from a political aspect.

In Miall’s theory, during the awareness phase, the conflict is still characterized by closed or latent conflict, not yet open. In this awareness phase, awareness or concern (conscientization) among community groups begins to grow towards the injustice they experience. In the case of the Aceh conflict, the awareness phase began to appear for the first time during the Daud Beureueh uprising on September 21, 1953. Awareness of Islamic identity inherent in Acehnese culture was reflected in demands for autonomy in the fields of religion and customs. The awareness phase in the Aceh conflict was also awakened when Hasan Tiro began to instill in the minds of the Acehnese that they had the right to govern their own country (Ali, 2008: 138). Miall’s theory of conflict transformation is good enough to explain how a conflict transforms into peace through several phases. As described above, in the case of the Aceh conflict, the flow of conflict started from the awareness phase, confrontation, then held negotiations and finally peace was reached.

**Soft Power Factors in Conflict Resolution**

During Soekarno’s reign the Aceh conflict used violence (hard power) which was often carried out during the Dutch colonial period up to the independence period. This brought Soekarno into the rebellion conflict carried out by Daud Beureueh over Aceh in September 1953 by disarming military operations in the 1953-1959 period. He uses hard power and soft power
in the form of granting limited special autonomy to the economic sector in the fields of education, culture, health, public works, agriculture, animal husbandry, land fisheries, small and social industries which have been recorded in Law no. 24/1956.

During the Soekarno era, many Aceh conflicts were resolved by hard power rather than soft power. This was done because he saw the background of the very monolithic Soeharto government with very strong military support. The existence of a strong military made Aceh a military operation area (DOM) with the aim of destroying GAM in 1989. In the Soeharto era, the government once implemented soft power in the form of a program of winning hearts and minds in winning the hearts of the people of Aceh by involving the TNI in infrastructure development programs in rural areas. In fact, the Suharto era involved more hard power, which led to harsh military operations against GAM during the DOM era, so that GAM leaders chose to flee abroad. This incident gave birth to a “new generation of vengeful” who secretly sympathized with GAM.

Entering the post-Soeharto era, namely, the era of Habibie, Gus Dur, and Megawati, the realm of government has used soft power in resolving conflicts. In the Habibie Era, he changed the security approach from the legacy of Suharto to a welfare approach by providing amnesty to GAM political prisoners, assistance for orphans, widows of DOM victims and opportunities for them to become civil servants and provide assistance in the field of education listed in the Law. -law no. 44/1999. During the Gus Dur era, soft power was exercised by him, namely holding negotiations with GAM resulting in a humanitarian pause agreement in May 2000. The de facto government recognized the existence of GAM as a political entity representing Aceh. In the Megawati era, the soft power that was implemented was to provide special autonomy through negotiations with GAM resulting in the COHA (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) agreement on December 9, 2002, but GAM rejected this condition. He canceled the negotiations and implemented hard power through a military emergency on 19 May 2003.

Seeing the development of government in the previous era by applying soft power and hard power to resolve the conflict in Aceh, it still failed. However, it is different from the SBY government which chose the soft power path by sending Farid Husain to approach several GAM figures where he himself used an informal, humanitarian and family approach so as to foster a sense of trust within the ranks of GAM leaders in the good intentions of SBY-JK to to resolve the Aceh conflict. His approach is more towards negotiation and dialogue so that there is no element of hard power. Through the process of approach taken by SBY-JK, the trust of the Indonesian government and GAM grew, resulting in a peace agreement contained in the Helsinki MOU and signed on August 15, 2005.

SBY-JK carried out decentralization politics in reducing the Aceh conflict through a democratic system. In line with the view put forward by Smith, political decentralization (in this case what is meant by devolution, namely the delegation of power to autonomous regions) resulted in the development of democracy (Smith, 1985:11). If Smith's theory is related to the Aceh conflict case, it is not entirely true. In fact, Indonesia has democratized the creation of decentralization in the form of regional autonomy and special autonomy through the central government. The post-New Order decentralization policy was carried out in line with the process of transforming Indonesian society towards democracy. This provides a proposition to show interest in democracy and the government's decision to give authority to the regions through decentralization policies so as to foster a sense of trust in the image of the democratic SBY-JK government towards GAM to return to resolving the Aceh conflict in a peaceful way.

To be able to achieve an interest between GAM and the government, a compromise was made, namely that Aceh remained part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, did not renounce itself to become an independent country, and obtained rights to 70% of oil and gas
products. This is in line with conflict resolution using soft power which results in both parties trying to reduce their demands through negotiations. In accordance with the beginning of the GAM rebellion under Hasan Tiro, it was caused by the economic injustice felt by Aceh, which has natural resources such as oil and natural gas (oil and gas). This triggered the Aceh conflict. Apart from these events, now Aceh has special privileges in the economic field. SBY-JK gave special autonomy in the economic sector to Aceh which was recorded in Law no. 18/2001 which contains the right to share revenue from oil and gas by 70% within 8 years. With the privileges that Aceh has, it can be a way to reduce conflict.

In Law no. 18/2001, the government gave Aceh the freedom to apply Islamic sharia, the formation of the Syar’iyah Court and customary institutions, namely in the form of Wali Nanggroe and customary God. The Helsinki MOU allowed Aceh to implement the Wali Nanggroe GAM customary institution, because this was obtained through negotiations and negotiations. The granting of autonomy in the social and cultural fields is also categorized as Soft Power. The existence of an Acehnese Islamic identity has become a prominent issue in the politics of decentralization in Aceh, this is what has resulted in its relationship with the central government since the beginning of the Republic of Indonesia being rocky. In the Aceh case, the strong cultural identity and unfulfilled hopes for social justice caused the Acehnese figures and leaders to rebel.

In the political field, negotiations in Helsinki faced a very crucial issue related to local parties. There are thoughts from Dr. Kingsbury, namely GAM’s adviser, brought back the idea related to the establishment of a local party in Aceh that the government had to fulfill if the government really wanted the negotiations to be successful. The existence of local parties as political vehicles needed by GAM, but for the Indonesian delegation itself still persisted by not agreeing with local parties on the grounds that Indonesia had never had any arrangements related to local parties. The existence of the Aceh conflict can be resolved through Soft Power, in dialogue and negotiations with GAM and SBY-JK. With the exposure of the Aceh issue on the international stage caused by the figure of Ahtisaari, with a good reputation in the field of conflict management, it is also influential in international political relations, especially among European Union countries.

Both the government and GAM agreed to appoint HDC as a conflict resolution mediator with their respective considerations. The election of this mediator is a middle way from the different references between the government and GAM. There was a case of conflict that occurred in East Timor, with Australia’s involvement in the UN mission making Indonesia feel uncomfortable, because it was considered to have geopolitical interests in the eastern region of Indonesia. The existence of Indonesia’s success, namely by making the transition from a government that was initially monopolistic to democracy. After the declaration of GAM in December 1976, Hasan Tiro made efforts to internationalize the Aceh conflict, namely not only by bringing the issue to the UN forum, but also by reaching out to several countries to provide support for the struggle for Aceh’s independence. But unfortunately the efforts made in seeking support from the Western world were not successful. So there have been efforts to internationalize the Aceh conflict since the time of the Daud Beureueh rebellion, which then continued in the Gusdur and Megawati eras, but all of the efforts made were unsuccessful.

During the SBY-JK era, Indonesia's way of resolving the Aceh conflict prioritized the Soft Power approach, which was appreciated as a way that was in harmony with democratic values. The existence of a way of positioning oneself is also considered as a developer for radical Islamic movements which tend to carry the image of moderate Islam which has shown an increasing tendency after the September 11 tragedy. With the resolution of the Aceh conflict through peaceful means, such as negotiations and negotiations, not through military violence,
it can be said that this method is in accordance with Soft Power and democratic values. The existence of several countries such as the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were very influential in international relations in providing support for Indonesia, not for the independence of Aceh.

The existence of the phenomenon of the use of power in central and regional relations, namely Hard Power and Soft Power, is relevant for analyzing the dynamics of conflict between the center and the regions, including the Aceh conflict. While in the SBY-JK government, there was the application of Soft Power through values and image instruments, a very significant role in the Aceh conflict resolution process, namely with the factor of democracy. There are five lessons from the Aceh conflict resolution, namely where the Aceh conflict can be resolved when the government can apply Soft Power consistently, in political matters there is a conflict solution, there is the application of Hard Power which needs to be combined with Soft Power, there is conflict resolution in the Suharto era using more Hard Power, whereas if the use of Hard Power and Soft Power is used consistently with their respective dimensions, so conflict resolution efforts can easily fail, so in the case of the Aceh conflict there was the application of Soft Power which was inconsistent with the four dimensions. In the application of Soft Power and Hard Power, new themes have emerged, namely "Quasi-Soft Power" and "Quasi-Hard Power. This absorption can be seen during Megawati's administration which offered forced special autonomy. Meanwhile, Quasi-Hard Power can be seen in the government that uses instruments of force, such as the military but by way of a persuasive approach or dialogue.

**Aceh Post Helsinki MoU**


According to the author of the book, resolution of the Aceh conflict was implemented differently in the post-Soeharto era. Habibie approached social welfare by granting amnesty to some GAM-linked political prisoners and directing financial assistance to orphans and widows of conflict victims (p. 39). In addition, the Habibie government also implemented a decentralization policy by issuing Law no. 44 of 1999 concerning Privileges of the Province of the Special Region of Aceh. The law gave Aceh special autonomy and power over education, religion, customs and the role of the clergy. President Abdurrahman Wahid’s tenure became a starting point for the use of soft power in efforts to resolve the conflict in Aceh. Efforts were made under Gus Dur's leadership to bring about a "humanitarian pause" sponsored by the Henry Dunant Center on May 12, 2000. Since the fall of Gus Dur, the Megawati government, led
by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, increased tensions between the central
government and GAM. Megawati’s unique efforts were made because Megawati used hard and
soft power to resolve the conflict in Aceh (Qonita & Nurgiansah, 2023).

Megawati was first published on May 19, 2003, before the formal imposition of martial
law in Aceh. 18/2001 authorizes Aceh to generate 70 percent of oil and gas revenues,
establishes a Wali Nanggroe and authorizes the Governor of Aceh to approve the appointment
of the Head of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Police and the District Attorney. But GAM thought
it was up to them, so the sound of the guns was unavoidable. Initially the Megawati government
had good intentions to return to negotiations with GAM, but GAM did not abandon its intention
without seeking independence. And do not want to accept the autonomy granted by the central
government. After the direct presidential election in 2004, bringing new life to the resolution
of the conflict in Aceh. The SBY-JK administration is firmly committed to comprehensively
resolving the Aceh conflict. The author of this book says that, before coming to the formal
negotiating table, the Indonesian government sent Farid Husein, a confidant of Jusuf Kalla, to
establish informal and family relations with GAM high-ranking officials.

As a result of this stage, institutions seek to mediate peace between the two. With the help
of Juha Cristian, the Crisis Management Initiative led by Martii Ahtisahr was founded, known
for reliable conflict resolution in countries such as Liberia, Ethiopia and the Middle East. The
new thing that the SBY-JK government did was negotiate with GAM elites, which the previous
administration had never done (p. 86). The content of the negotiations this time also touched
on the core of the problem, namely empowering local politics by forming a local Aceh party,
giving economic rights to share 70% of oil and gas revenues. in the socio-cultural field, the
independence of Aceh applies Islamic law and the preservation of Acehnese customs. After the
fall of Suharto, a new paradigm was explored that prioritized negotiations. Meanwhile B.J.
Habibie, adopted Law no. 44 of 1999 concerning the Right to Self-Determination Specifically in
the Fields of Education, Religion and Customs. Under President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur),
a humanitarian ceasefire was agreed in May 2000. When Megawati was replaced by Gus Dur,
who was removed by the MPR, the Special Autonomy Law no. 18/2001: Oil and gas 70%,
Islamic law, and Wali Nanggroe born. TNI Bhakti also restored the TNI. Nonetheless, hostilities
continued and GAM continued to fight. As a result, during the Soekarno and Megawati eras, the
two approaches, hard power and soft power, were always used either separately or together. It
was only during the direct election of President and Vice President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-
Jusuf Kalla in 2004 that these strict rules were abandoned. Jusuf Kalla approached GAM in an
informal, humanitarian and familial way. The values of democracy, equality and dialogue are
considered to be of primary importance. Results? The Helsinki negotiations took place in
January 2005. In August 2005, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed.
So Aceh is peaceful as it seems so far.

CONCLUSION
Conflict is something that is often seen as a problem that can break a relationship. There
are so many things that will be felt if a conflict is not handled. The problems in Aceh were quite
tense at the time so that the area once received a status from the government as a military
emergency area. How not, every conflict that occurs is always handled by means of violence. All
kinds of efforts to overcome the violence have been made, starting from Sukarno’s leadership
to Megawati. Even when several agreements were made and signed, the violence did not stop.
It was only when the leadership of SBY-JK, efforts to resolve the conflict using soft power began
to succeed. Since then, several conflicts have been resolved through peaceful means and
dialogue. This was marked by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding or often called
the MoU agreement.
There were two phases in the politics of decentralization and conflict resolution in Aceh. The first was when Aceh only demanded privileges in implementing Islamic law, such as the demands of the Daud Beureueh rebellion in an attempt to quell the rebellion with Law no. 24/1956, the government only gave Aceh its own separate province from North Sumatra. While the special authority to implement Islamic law and maintain Acehnese customs which was precisely the core of Daud Beureueh’s demands was not accommodated, this is evident from the non-fulfillment of the wishes of the Acehnese people by the Center, namely privileges in carrying out Islamic law and maintaining adat as a result of which Daud Beureueh’s rebellion continued. Second, when Aceh’s demands became more serious, namely the separation from Indonesia as an independent state proclaimed by Hasan Tiro in 1976, Hasan Tiro’s rebellion was caused by economic injustice, so Aceh demanded independence as its own separate country from Indonesia.

In order to achieve an interest between GAM and the government, a compromise was made, namely that Aceh remained part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, did not renounce itself to become an independent country, and obtained rights to 70% of oil and gas products. This is in line with conflict resolution using soft power which results in both parties trying to reduce their demands through negotiations. The various compromises contained in the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM to end nearly 3 (three) decades of conflict were set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement”, signed by the Government of Indonesia in Helsinki and GAM.

BIBLIOGRAPHY