Integrasi Arsitektur C6ISR Dalam Strategi Antisipatif Deteksi Aktivitas Mencurigakan pada Infrastruktur Kabel Bawah Laut Indonesia: Kajian Strategis 2024–2026
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57235/jetish.v6i1.9316Keywords:
C6ISR; kabel bawah laut; keamanan maritim; operasi zona abu-abu; ketahanan infrastruktur kritis; UNCLOS; kedaulatan digitalAbstract
Infrastruktur kabel bawah laut merupakan komponen kritis ekonomi digital global dan menjadi elemen penting dalam keamanan maritim selama periode 2024–2026. Geografi Indonesia sebagai negara kepulauan menempatkan jalur kabel, stasiun pendaratan, dan koridor maritim tertentu dalam lingkungan operasi yang kompleks, di mana kerusakan tidak disengaja, aktivitas kriminal, pemaksaan geopolitik, dan gangguan disengaja sulit dibedakan secara waktu nyata. Penelitian ini mengkaji bagaimana arsitektur C6ISR terintegrasi dapat memperkuat deteksi, penilaian atribusi, ketahanan, dan pengambilan keputusan atas insiden kabel bawah laut. C6ISR dalam penelitian ini digunakan sebagai konstruksi analitis khusus yang mengintegrasikan command, control, communications, computers, cyber defence, combat/intervention, intelligence, surveillance, dan reconnaissance; istilah ini tidak dimaksudkan sebagai klaim bahwa C6ISR merupakan akronim doktrinal tunggal yang telah terstandardisasi secara universal. Penelitian menggunakan telaah dokumen dan studi kasus komparatif terhadap insiden Yi Peng 3 dan Eagle S di Laut Baltik, sistem Pukpuk 1 yang diresmikan pada 2026, inisiatif internasional ketahanan kabel, serta kerangka UNCLOS. Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa deteksi dan atribusi membutuhkan fusi multi-sumber; ketentuan UNCLOS relevan tetapi tidak memberikan kewenangan penegakan universal yang sederhana bagi negara pantai di EEZ; dan ketahanan bergantung pada kombinasi sensing, koordinasi kelembagaan, diversifikasi rute, kesiapan perbaikan, keamanan stasiun pendaratan, serta kesiapan hukum. Artikel ini mengembangkan arsitektur C6ISR berlapis yang menghubungkan sensing, fusi data, penilaian hukum, keputusan komando, respons, dan pemulihan dalam satu siklus keputusan. Artikel tidak menyimpulkan bahwa insiden tertentu merupakan operasi terselubung yang disponsori negara tanpa temuan otoritatif; kasus digunakan untuk menguji tantangan deteksi, atribusi, dan yurisdiksi.
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